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Abstract:	   The	  present	  model	  analyses	  how	   the	   state	  would	  provide	   services	  when	   the	  
change	  of	  power	  depends	  upon	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  state.	  Agents	  can	  evaluate	  state	  
performance	  based	  either	  only	  on	   the	   receipt	  of	   government	   services,	   or	  both	  on	   the	  
benefit	   from	  government	  services	  and	  taxes	   imposed.	  With	  a	  credible	   threat	  of	  power	  
change,	   if	   the	   valuation	   of	   the	   government	   services	   is	   low,	   along	   with	   a	   low	   fiscal	  
capacity,	  then	  it	  is	  less	  probable	  that	  this	  service	  would	  be	  provided.	  Furthermore,	  such	  
an	   allocation	   is	   compared	   with	   a	   situation,	   when	   there	   exists	   a	   threat	   of	   active	  
opposition.	   Interestingly,	   that	   threat	   does	   not	   change	   the	   optimum	   provisioning	   of	  
government	  services	  (as	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  situation)	  in	  the	  equilibrium.	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1 Introduction
Modern states are often designated as “welfare states”. Often, the duty
of the welfare state is to provide government services, which typically mar-
kets cannot provide efficiently. For example, neo-classical economists argue
that markets fail to provide public goods efficiently, and hence state should
provide such goods.1 Meanwhile, most of these modern welfare states are
“democratic” and are characterized by various political parties, competing
among themselves to capture power. Government service provisioning can
affect election outcomes (for example, see Pierre and Sandrine 2011), and
it is often the case that, in a democracy, one of the criterion by which the
electorate judges the performance of these parties (and thereby their worth)
is their relative effectiveness in providing such service. States that may fail
to provide various welfare services can land itself in a situation of social
unrest. On a similar note, there is a prominent literature in political science
where the role of public provisioning in electoral decision (Greasley et al.
2011, Gherghina 2011, etc.) is discussed. Indeed, in a society with ethnic,
class or any other division that becomes the basis of deprivation, conflict
can be an obvious outcome.2 The present contribution tries to capture this
facet of a modern welfare state by developing a very simple model.
In a world inhabited by two distinct groups, when each individual of
either group values the service provided by the state, political competition
among these two groups can yield some very striking conclusions. As ar-
gued above, political regime change, in this model, depends crucially on
the government’s performance in providing the service. The incumbent
leader does not have any information about the actual identity of the people
(and hence the measure of its support), who would support the ruling party
during change of power. However, the incumbent leader believes that the
probability of winning depends upon its fiscal policy (i.e. on its decision of
service provisioning). On this note, we develop two different models, one
with “partially rational agents” and the other with “fully rational agents”.3
In the former set up, agents only care about the amount of service received,
and does not evaluate the role of government as an efficient provider of
1 In the words of Milton Friedman: “It can be argued that private charity is insufficient
because the benefits from it accrue to people other than those who make the gifts ... I am
distressed by the sight of poverty; I am benefited by its alleviation; but I am benefited
equally whether I or someone else pays for its alleviation” (see Friedman 1962).
2 See Howard (2014). Gurr (1968) argues in his book “Why Men Rebel” that relative de-
privation is the most often cause of rebellion. We do not intend to posit that relative
deprivation among two or more groups can only be in terms of welfare services received
from the government. However, since the state can directly affect the economy in a cap-
italist society by allocation of the public goods, this indeed is a very plausible channel
that can cause social conflicts.
3 Agents strictly speaking are the voters, or more precisely the constituents. Our choice of
the nomenclature is keeping with the usage in the literature of political economy.
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public good. In the second model with fully rational agents, the incumbent
leader believes that the agents are more conscious, and would only support
the government, if they are better off vis-a-vis a situation where there is no
government. Here, government has no role but to redistribute. The agents
would support only if they get more than their private income by support-
ing the incumbent leader. The belief structure of the incumbent leader is
thus different in the two cases, and neither of the situations are fully deter-
ministic. While the exercises are pretty different, the equilibrium results are
quite close. If people have a very high valuation for the government service,
then the service will be provided in its full capacity (which will be financed
by taxes that would be charged at the maximum level). If the agents’ de-
mand for the service is low, no service will be provided at all. More inter-
estingly, maximization of expected utility by the incumbent leader entails,
that in such a situation the benefit of the subsidy will be provided to the op-
position.4 This is because at the equilibrium a very low level of government
service has been provided, it is highly probable that the incumbent leader
would lose the elections. Thus, in the next period taxes levied on the op-
position may become applicable on the incumbent leader with a sufficiently
high probability. Although the second result is also generated when agents
are fully rational, but in that case no equilibrium value can be determined
(in terms of policy variables). However, optimal policy direction can always
be specified. This is discussed in some details in Section 2.3.
In another variant of the model, the role of a more pro-active opposi-
tion is discussed. Note that the previous version of the model, does not
include any active participation of the opposition leader. The probability of
losing power, as faced by the ruling incumbent leader, depends only on the
performance of the incumbent leader, as evaluated by its ability to deliver
government service (its failure to do so satisfactorily can be viewed as a sort
of anti-incumbency). It is now assumed that the opposition may develop
costly action termed as “arms” and initiate a “violent revolution” (the term
is used only for ease of nomenclature). This can reduce the probability of
winning, for the incumbent leader. In case the agents do not value the ser-
vice much, the opposition is going to get the subsidy. Moreover, to have a
situation of armed conflict, both the valuation of government service by the
agents and the marginal impact of arms on the probability of power change
should be high simultaneously. Otherwise, the opposition leader does not
have sufficient incentive to capture power in the next period through in-
vesting in arms. Thus, the opposition necessarily does not try to enforce the
state to provide the public service, and will choose to revolt only in those
situations where the marginal benefit from government service is very high.
This can be corroborated with the fact that armed conflicts generally occur
in poorer parts of the world, since it is more likely that poor people will
4 Interestingly Pierre and Sandrine (2011), show that pro government districts received
lesser public investment than the pro opposition districts.
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have a higher demand for the government services (see Bhattacharya et al.
2016 for a relevant discussion).
In comparison with the existing literature, the present paper fits in with
the contribution of the role of government’s performance while political
regime change is a contingent outcome. The issue of political outcome and
government performance is not completely new. Greasley et al. (2011),
Pacek (1994), Stokes et al. (1958), etc. examine various aspects of gov-
ernment performances vis-a-vis political outcomes from different part of
the world. However, though it has been discussed extensively in the lit-
erature of political science, economists are not very categorical about this
issue. Fairly large amount of literature exists on the side of political econ-
omy and public good provisioning separately. Our model is, somewhat,
related to both these strands of literature. Although, instead of incorporat-
ing a “public good”, we designate the government providing “services” to
the citizens. This is because states in reality seldom provide pure public
goods to its citizens and the services they provide are often characterized
by excludability and rivalry. A large number of paper deals in public eco-
nomics with the question of ”publicness” of public good, or more generally,
public service (Haque 2001, Pesch 2008, Miller and Multon 2014 etc.). In
fact, this property of excludability can become the source of political con-
tention. Bowen (1943) and Stiglitz (1988) show that inefficient allocation of
public good can arise in an equilibrium, when the outcome desired by the
median voter differs from that of the standard optimum criteria envisaged
by Samuelson. In Chari et al. (1997), bargaining between the presidential
and local representative leads to an excessive number of public projects to
be undertaken in the equilibrium. Persson et al. (1997) compares congres-
sional and parliamentary political systems and shows that if the politician
can appropriate money from the public good project for his/her own dis-
trict, then once more a common pool problem may arise. Lizeri and Perisco
(2001) compares a winner-take-all system (where all the spoils go to the win-
ner) to a proportional system (where the spoils of office are split among the
candidates proportionally to their share of the vote). It is shown that, in the
former system, public good provided is lesser than the latter.
In a seminal contribution, Besley and Persson (2010) develop a model
that analyses the incentives for states to invest in legal and fiscal capaci-
ties and relates this with the risk of external or internal conflict, the degree
of political instability, and dependence on natural resources. This model is
closely related to Besley and Persson (2010) in terms of its structure. Specif-
ically, the government service is assumed to be a non-excludable consump-
tion item, received directly from the state. Consumption of the agents also
has a private component which is financed through the net (after tax) wage
income. The indirect utility of the individuals thus depends directly on the
quantity of government service available in the society (and their disposable
labour income). The major departure from the model developed by Besley
Copyright c© 2017 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 4
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and Persson (2010) is that we assume the probability of remaining in office
for the incumbent leader depends positively on the level of government ser-
vices provided. This has obvious implications for the intuitions derived in
this set-up. Besley and Persson (2010) reports: “There now exists a large lit-
erature on conflict in the third world (see, e.g., Sambanis 2002 and Blattman and
Miguel 2009 for broad reviews). Counting all countries and years since 1950, the
incidence of civil war is about 6%,with a yearly peak of more than 12% (in 1991
and 1992), according to the Correlates of War data set. The cumulated death toll in
civil conflicts since the Second World War exceeds 15 million (Lacina and Gledtisch
2005). A robust empirical fact is that poor countries are disproportionately more
likely to be involved in civil war. There are two leading interpretations of this cor-
relation in the literature: Fearon and Laitin (2003) see conflict in poor countries as
reflecting limited capacity to put down rebellions by weak states, while Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) see it as reflecting lower opportunity costs of fighting.”
Arguing that the literature on the civil war treats state capacity as exoge-
nous, Besley and Persson (2010) develop a dynamic model of state capacity
to explain the persistence of conflicts in the poorer parts of the world. We
derive a similar result, but through a completely different channel. As dis-
cussed above, the performance of the government is gauged by the individ-
uals as its ability to provide the service, at least this is what the incumbent
leader perceives. Lower demand for government service entails that it is
provided in a lesser volume, and this low demand implies that the opposi-
tion also has a reduced motivation to start a revolution. Moreover, the threat
of armed conflict does not increase the provisioning of government service.
Indeed regions with prolonged threat of armed coercion did not necessarily
have better government services.
Section 2 develops the basic model without arms. Section 3 extends the
basic model to incorporate the possibility of armed coercion. Finally, Section
4 concludes the model.
2 The model
In this section, we develop two consecutive models, the first one with
agents who are “partially rational” and the second one with “fully rational”
agents. In the first model developed in Subsection 2.1 and 2.2, the incum-
bent leader believes that the voters decide to vote, only on the basis of the
public service provided. This case is restrictive, but has the advantage of
being analytically tractable and also helps in understanding the solution
technique adopted in the rest of the paper. Moreover, there is a debate in
the literature on political economy5 about the effectiveness of taxation on
electoral outcome. In Subsection 2.3, we build the second model with fully
rational agent, where agents not only include taxes in their voting decision
5 See Stokes et al. (1958) for a discussion on how voters can have very different perspec-
tives while deciding to exercise their franchise
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but also consider whether the stateless society provides or not more benefit.
2.1 Assumptions and structurewith “partially rational agents”
The economy comprises of two distinct groups, namely the “incumbent
group” and the “opposition-group”. The total population size is normal-
ized to unity and is distributed uniformly within the interval [0, 1]. Without
any loss of generality, the first half of the population distribution from [0, 1
2
)
is designated to be the incumbent group, while the distribution from [1
2
, 1]
is that of the opposition group. To fix ideas, it is further assumed that there
is no inter-group movement of agents.6 The two extremes of the distribu-
tion are inhabited by the two “leaders” and they are the decision-makers for
their respective groups. There are two time periods, s = 1, 2; in the first one
the incumbent leader is the ruler of the country. Before the second period
begins (i.e. at the junction of the first and second period), there can be a
change in power and the opposition leader may become the new ruler.7 All
taxes are levied in the first period. Building closely on Besley and Persson
(2010), it is assumed that the ruler can impose a discriminating taxation sys-
tem, i.e. two different tax rates on the two groups. It is further assumed
that these tax rates have both an upper bound and lower bound. Specifi-
cally, tj ∈ [−t, t] when 0 < t < 1 and j = {O, I}. O represents the opposition
and I represents the incumbent group. t (−t) represents the fiscal infrastruc-
ture, or the constitutional restriction on the maximum possible tax (subsidy
rate).8 To keep matters interesting, it is assumed that the state cannot siphon
off the entire income of the agents (t < 1).
Tax receipts collected by the government are used to finance a particular
government service G.9 The good G is only partially non-excludable. The
agents who receive this good (i.e., the part of the total population to whom
the incumbent ruler bestows upon this service) shares this good in a non-
rival and non-excludable fashion. However, it is indeed possible for the
state to exclude some members of total population from the consumption of
G.10 Thus, the total amount of government service provided in the economy
6 The two groups can be seen as two ethnic groups like Hindus and Muslims, or Tutshi
and Hutu.
7 The dynamics of this power change is discussed later.
8 By subsidy, we mean negative values for tj . We represent taxes by tj ∈ [−t, t]. When
tj ∈ [−t, 0), then the j-th individual receives a subsidy. Again when tj ∈ [0, t], then taxes
are imposed strictly reducing the j-th individual’s income.
9 Actually it represents the aggregate public expenditure made by the government on the
service. See the related discussion in Besley and Persson (2010).
10 Government announces budget allocation for certain project, like road, electrification
etc. Since, as argued above, implementation actually takes place at the time of the next
government (i.e., at second period), it can be suitably implemented. For example, if the
eastern part of a country is strong political base of opposition and the western part is
for incumbent of period 1, and if after the electoral process opposition of period 1 comes
in power at period 2 then the leader may start to implement the public policy from the
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is given by
G =
tI
2
+
tO
2
. (1)
It should be noted, that though taxes are levied on the entire population
according to their affiliations, the good G is not received by all. This follows
from the fact that t < 1. Moreover, the incumbent leader would always
enjoy the government service himself/herself, i.e., the allocation of G in
this economy is such that it cannot preclude the incumbent leader from its
ownership.11
Besides the production of the service, the economy produces a final good
(for consumption) using labour. Each agent is endowed with one unit of
labour, which he/she supplies inelastically at the prevailing wage rate, w.
The consumption good is produced using a constant returns to scale pro-
duction function, and sold in a perfectly competitive market. Thus, the
consumption good price is equalized with the wage. The utility function
is linear in consumption, which in turn implies that the indirect utility de-
pends on the net income (i.e. disposable income which is the income left to
the agents after they have paid taxes). Indirect utility at any period, for a
particular individual j, is given by
U j = α(G)(Dj) + (1− tj)w = αGDj + (1− tj) (2)
where Dj = 0, if the j-th agent does not receive G and Dj = 1, otherwise.
The second equality follows by setting w = 1, that is we choose labour to
be the numeraire. It should be noted that the G feeds into the indirect util-
ity function of the agents directly, and in a non-excludable and non-taxable
manner. Following Besley and Persson (2010), α is the valuation of the gov-
ernment service by the agents. Alternatively, one can consider it as a pro-
portion of the total service provided, that becomes productive and enters
into the budget constraints of individuals in a non taxable manner.12
The incumbent leader believes that with probability γ, where γ ∈ (0, 1),
it can retain its power in the next period. Moreover, the incumbent be-
lieves that this probability depends upon the amount of G it provides to
the agents. It is for this reason that we term such agents as “partially ratio-
nal”. Incumbent leader believes that agents care only about the amount of
G received and not the opportunity cost of this service. Thus, without any
loss of generality, it is assumed
γ = G. (3)
eastern region of the country. See Pierre and Sandrine (2011) for a case study of Ghana.
11 In terms of Figure 1, the allocation of G always starts from the point A.
12 Barro (1990), Acemoglu and Robinson(2000), and Besley and Persson (2010) model public
goods in a similar manner. In all these models, the public good is introduced into the
indirect utility function as a non-excludable consumption item.
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Figure 1 - Service provisioning by the government
Figure 1 illustrates the above discussion. The lineAB represents the total
population of unit mass and the two extreme points A and B are the posi-
tions of the incumbent and the opposition leaders respectively. Suppose in
the first period the incumbent provides G for all the people (who may be-
long to either of the groups) inhabiting the length AC. It would expect that
all people residing in this region would support the incumbent leader in the
next period (or rather at the junction of the two periods, when the power
actually changes). In other words, the total amount of people the incum-
bent leader believes would support the ruling party is simply G. Since the
construction of the model implies that G ∈ [0, 1) (see equation (1) and that
t < 1), it is assumed that the amount of government service provided can be
considered the measure of γ.13 Moreover, the structure of the model implies
that the opposition leader never receives the service provided by the incum-
bent leader. This follows from the fact that the government cannot impose
a tax equal to unity and thus from equation (1), G is always less than one
(the length of AB). In other words, government cannot provide the service
to the entire population of length one, given the limits on the fiscal capacity
(t < 1).14
At the end of period 1, the incumbent leader announces the tax rate and
at the juncture of two periods, the power can be transferred from incum-
bent to the opposition leader. The opposition leader now becomes the new
incumbent ruler and faces the tax rate set for the incumbent by the previ-
ous government. The government service is provided in the second period.
Note that taxes are announced on the basis of political positions, one for
the incumbent and one for the opposition. Still, it remains binding in the
13 Note that assuming γ = f(G) and f ′(G) > 0would have generated a qualitatively similar
result. However, the specific form of equation (3) makes the model simpler and we have
the result that no government service will be provided at all if its demand is sufficiently
low.
14 Note that though in theory equation (1) does not rule out the possibility that the measure
of the service provided by the government can be negative (G < 0), we simply assume
that the Constitution of the country does not allow such a possibility to rise. Hence it is
not feasible.
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second period (when the service is actually received), while the identity of
these two groups may actually change (with a probability 1− γ), i.e. the op-
position may now become the ruler. Thus, while announcing the tax rates
the incumbent leader would maximize a weighted sum of the gains that it
would derive from remaining in power, and if it looses power and becomes
the opposition. If there is no change in power, then the present incumbent
leader would get a utility given by equation (2), while if it looses power and
becomes the opposition leader, since there would be no access to the gov-
ernment service, would derive utility only from consumption. These cases
can arise with the probabilities γ and 1−γ, respectively. The expected utility
of the incumbent leader is represented by EV IR . Using equations (1), (2) and
(3), EV IR can be expressed as:
EV IR =
[
(1− tI) + α
2
(tI + tO)
]
(
tI + tO
2
) + (1− tO)(1− t
I + tO
2
). (4)
Though EV IR is the expected utility of the incumbent leader, still the nega-
tive impact for taxes for both the groups enter in the RHS of equation (4).
This is because the incumbent leader also takes into account the fact that in
the next period, it may lose power and become the opposition. Thus a high
tax rate on the opposition in that situation may become too costly in that
case (see the second term in the RHS of equation (4). The opposition leader,
in this basic model, does not have any policy variables under its control and
thus has to passively face the tax rates imposed by the unilateral decision of
the state.
2.2 Equilibrium with partially rational agents
Interestingly, if there is no chance of power change, then EV I = 1 −
tI + α
2
(tI + tO), which implies that the incumbent leader would always set
t0∗ = t for the opposition, and for its own group members would set a tax
rate tI∗ = t when α > 2 and tI∗ = −t if α < 2. A relatively high value
of α implies a high demand of the government service (compared to that
for private consumption) and thus even when there is no threat of change
in power the incumbent right wing leader would provide the maximum
possible amount of G to both the groups. However, if the demand of state
service is relatively low (α < 2), then the right wing leader would provide
the maximum subsidy possible to the own group members. Members of the
opposition would have to pay the maximum tax in both these situations. In
other words, for high α, the incumbent taxes both groups at the maximum
fiscal capacity and spends all the revenue on G. If state provided services
are not very valuable as opposed to private consumption, no service would
be provided and all available tax receipts are transferred to the incumbent
group (through the maximum possible negative tax rate).15
15 This result is similar to Besley and Perrson (2010).
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Now, if a credible threat of power change does exist, and if the probabil-
ity of power change depends on state service provisioning, then the objec-
tive function of the incumbent leader should take the utility of opposition
leader into account. This implies that the right wing leader would set tI and
tO to maximize equation (4). Differentiating the expected return of the ruler,
with respect to the tax rates, the following expressions can be obtained:
δEV IR
δtO
= −1 + tO + α
2
(tI + tO) (5)
and
δEV IR
δtI
= −tI + α
2
(tI + tO). (6)
The first-order conditions for maximization (obtained by equating the RHS
of the eqs. 5 and 6 to 0) are no longer valid in this case, as the second-order
sufficiency condition is not satisfied. The basic intuition of the optimiza-
tion technique, adopted throughout the rest of the paper, is separating out
the objective function in different zones where the function is increasing ac-
cording to different directional movements of the policy variables, namely,
tI and tO.16
Proposition 1 In the present model, if the demand for government services
is high i.e. α > 2
t
, then tI∗ = tO∗ = t, while if there is a low demand for
government service i.e. α ≤ 2
t
then tI∗ = t, tO∗ = −t.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 is the central result of this section. If the demand for gov-
ernment service is high enough (reflected by a high α, i.e. α > 2
t
), then the
service will be provided in its full capacity (taxes are charged at the maxi-
mum). If the agents do not have much demand for the service (i.e. α ≤ 2
t
),
no government service will be provided at all. This directly follows from
the optimization program of the leader. More interestingly, maximization
of expected utility by the incumbent leader entails that in such a case the
benefit of the subsidy will be provided to the opposition. This is because a
low value of G implies, that γ is lower and the incumbent ruler strongly be-
lieves it will lose power. Thus, in the second period, it will be in the position
of the opposition and thus announces subsidy for the opposition in the first
period. Proposition 1 also implies that, for a given level of demand for gov-
ernment service, in those countries where fiscal infrastructure is not strong
(low t), public services are less likely to be provided (since for provisioning
of G, α has to be greater than 2
t
).17
16 The relevant Hessian determinant does not alternate in sign, which is the sufficient sec-
ond order condition for maximization.
17 It should be noted that, since α is a constant, this is not a case of multiple equilibrium.
Proposition 1, describes the various possible equilibriums for different permissible val-
ues of α. For a given α, we have an unique equilibrium.
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2.3 Equilibrium with fully rational agents
In the model developed in the previous section, the belief of the state is
that agents who inhabit the economy care only about the amount of gov-
ernment service received. The only reason that taxation causes dis-utility is
due to the fact that it reduces disposable income, and thereby reduces con-
sumption (see equation 2). As a consequence of such a belief, government
expects the probability of getting again the power to be directly equal to the
amount of service received by the people (see equation 3). In this section18
we develop a model where the state believes that people would vote for
government party only if the net return received from the government ser-
vice after taxes is positive.19 Formally, if the amount of government received
by each agent is G and the tax levied t, then:
γ = N(S), (7)
where S is the set of people with αG − t > 0, and N(S) represents the
cardinal number of the set S, i.e. those people who get net benefit from
the government service after paying the taxes.20 For pedagogical purposes
we designate such agents as “fully rational”. Such agents are perceived by
the government as evaluating the role of the state as an efficient provider
of the service. The state can only hope to garner support of an individual
s if and only if s ∈ S. The equilibrium is characterized in three successive
steps, where the valuation of the government service is very high (α > 2),
is moderate (α = 2) and is very low (α < 2) respectively. Notion of the
equilibrium remains the same as earlier. Incumbent leader maximises its
expected utility with respect to the taxes imposed.
The expected utility of incumbent leader is:
EV IR =
[
(1− tI) + αG)
]
γ + (1− tO)(1− γ). (8)
From equation (1), this can be expressed as
EV IR = 1− tI(1−
α
2
)γ − tO[1− γ(1 + α
2
)]. (9)
Notice that the expected utility of the incumbent leader depends both on
the taxes levied on the incumbent members (tI) and on the opposition mem-
bers (tO). For different choices of these taxes, γ, would be different. That,
18 The authors are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting to develop this section.
19 Otherwise, the absence of the state gives more utility. As pointed out in the next para-
graph, agents would support the government only if αG − t > 0. This condition es-
sentially implies that government makes agents better off than a society without govern-
ment. Private income without government is 1; after redistribution it becomes 1−tj+αG
for the j th individual.
20 It should be noted that our normalization, that total number of agents is distributed uni-
formly within an interval ensures that γ ∈ [0, 1].
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in turn, implies that we cannot optimise EV IR directly in terms of the tax
rates. For different range of these tax rates, γ would be different. The nature
of γ is quite different from the previous section. Here γ is not continuous
and monotonic in terms of public expenditure and taxes. Thus, the opti-
misation programme of the incumbent leader becomes a bit involved. We
need to separate out zones of tI and tO, and determine γ in terms of the
tax rates.21 For each of these ranges, the locally optimal strategy of the in-
cumbent leader is identified. Comparing these local optima we can find the
global optimal.
Case I : Moderate valuation of state provided service (α = 2)
In this case,
EV IR = 1− t0(1− 2γ). (10)
(i) Suppose tI = βIt and tO = βOt, and 0 ≤ βI , βO ≤ 1.22 So, the total
amount of service available will be 1
2
(βI + βO)t and since all those who re-
ceive the government service would benefit, γ = G. Substituting this into
equation (10), EV IR becomes an increasing function of β
I . Thus, it would be
optimal to choose βI = 1. Then
EV IR = 1− βOt+ βOt2(1 + βO). (11)
As βO ∈ [0, 1], EV IR is a convex function. Moreover, EV IR(βO = 0) = 1, and
EV IR(β
O = 1) = 1− t+ 2t2. Hence,
EV IR(β
O = 1)− EV IR(βO = 0) = t(2t− 1).
Thus, if t > 1
2
, βI = βO = 1 and EV IR = 1− t + 2t2. If t < 12 , then βI = 1 and
βI = 0, while EV IR = 1. Else, t =
1
2
and the incumbent leader is indifferent
between the two situations.
(ii) Suppose, tI = βIt, and tO = −βOt, where 0 < βI , βO ≤ 1. Then,
G = 1
2
(βI−βO)t < 1
2
. Clearly all opposition group members would support,
but no member of the incumbent group would. Thus, γ∗ = 1
2
and EV IR = 1
(see equation (11)). If t > 1
2
, (i) dominates (ii), and for t ≤ 1
2
, both (i) and (ii)
are equivalent.
(iii) Suppose, tI = −βIt, and tO = βOt and 0 < βI , βO ≤ 1. Then
G = 1
2
(βI − βO)t < 1
2
. It is easy to check that opposition members would
not support, but all incumbent members would support. Thus, γ∗ = 1
2
and
EV IR = 1 (see equation (11)). The rest of the analysis is similar to the previ-
ous case.
The discussion from (i) to (iii) can be summarized in the following propo-
sition:
21 In each of these zones γ is continuous.
22 Introduction of βO and βI are for notational ease.
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Proposition 2 In the present model with fully rational agents, if the demand for
government service is moderate (α = 2), and if t > 1
2
, then tI = tO = t. Otherwise,
there are multiple equilibrium.
Proposition 2 says that when the valuation for the government service is
moderate, then the state would provide the service only if the fiscal capac-
ity is high enough. On the other hand, if the state’s fiscal capacity is low,
then in case of moderate valuation of G, the role of the state becomes pas-
sive. Relocation through tax and subsidy does not give any unique global
optimum.
Case II : High valuation of state provided service (α > 2)
In this case also, equation (9) gives the return of the incumbent leader.
We proceed to establish the equilibrium, following the same procedure as
in the previous case.
(i) Suppose tI = −βIt, and tO = βOt, where both βI and βO are strictly
positive, less than unity and βO > βI . The total amount of government ser-
vice available with the economy will be G = 1
2
(βO − βI)t, which is less than
1
2
. All right wing members, those who get the service and those who do not
get would support (since those who do not receive the government service
will get a subsidy). Contrarily, the opposition members would not support.
Thus, the incumbent leader would expect that half of the population would
support it during regime change, and thus γ = 1
2
. From equation (9), the
utility of the incumbent leader becomes
EV IR = 1−
βIt
2
(
α
2
− 1) + β
Ot
2
(1 +
α
2
). (12)
Optimality demands that the incumbent leader chooses βO = 1 and βI = ,
where  is a very small positive number. Thus, the expression in equation
(12) can be expressed as
EV IR = 1−
t
2
(
α
2
− 1) + t
2
(
α
2
− 1). (13)
(ii) Suppose, tI = 0 and tO = βOt. Then some incumbent members get
G = β
Ot
2
, and do not have to pay any taxes, while some neither receive the
government service or pay taxes. On the other hand, the opposition pays
taxes, but does not receive any government service (as G < 1
2
in this case).
Thus γ = β
Ot
2
. Using equation (9), it is straightforward to check that the
utility of the incumbent leader in this case is:
EV IR = 1− βOt+
βO2t2
2
(1 +
α
2
) (14)
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which is a convex function of βO. The incumbent leader would either choose
βO = 0 which yields an utility EV IR(0, 0) = 1, or β
O = 1 with corresponding
utility EV IR(0, 1) = 1− t+ t
2
2
(1 + α
2
), if t < 4
(α+2)
, or t > 4
(α+2)
respectively.
(iii) Now consider the polar opposite case. That is, the incumbent taxes
only its own group members. So tI = βIt, where again βI is strictly pos-
itive and less than unity, and tO = 0. Following a similar argument as in
case (ii), γ = β
I t
2
and the expected utility of the incumbent leader would be
EV IR(1, 0) = 1 +
t2
2
(α
2
− 1).23
(iv) Suppose tI = βIt and tO = −βOt, where both βI and βO are strictly
positive and βI > β0. Then, the amount of government service available
in the economy would be G = (β
I−βO)t
2
. All the opposition members would
support the government, while only those incumbent members who receive
the government service would support. Thus, the government would ex-
pect that γ = (β
I−βO)t
2
+ 1
2
. This gives an expected utility EV IR = 1 + (
α
2
−
1) t
2
(βI − βO) + t2
2
[(βI − βO)2 − (βI2 − βO2)]. The incumbent leader would
choose βI = 1, and βO = −, where  is a very small positive number.
(v) Finally, let us assume that the incumbent leader taxes both the groups
in the economy. So tI = βIt, tO = βOt and both βI and βO are strictly
positive. Since α > 2, for all those who receives the service, αG − tk is
positive, where k ∈ (I, O). Hence, γ = G = (βI+βO)t
2
. The incumbent
leader would choose, βI = βO = 1 if α > 4−2t
3t
and would receive an utility
EV IR(1, 1) = 1 + αt
2 − t. Otherwise, the government would set βI = 1, and
βO = 0, which gives utility EV IR(1, 0) = 1 +
t2
2
(α
2
− 1).
Our analysis from cases (i) to (v), when α > 2, implies that the expected
utility of the incumbent leader is simply a function of βI and βO, i.e. EV IR =
EV IR(β
I , βO). The optimal strategy of the government would be to compare
the expected utility levels in each case and then choose βI and βO to obtain
the maximum utility level possible. First let us compare EV IR(−, 1) and
EV IR(0, 1). See equation (11) and case (iii).
EV IR(−, 1)− EV IR(0, 1) =
αt
4
(1 + t) +
t
2
(1− t)− (...) > 0 ∀α, (15)
when  is sufficiently small. Moreover, for a relatively higher fiscal capacity,
t > 1
2
, EV IR(−, 1) > EV IR(1, 1) if α > 2(t−1)1−3t and EV IR(−, 1) < EV IR(1, 1),
otherwise.24
When fiscal capacity is low, t < 1
2
, then case (iv) dominates all the other
possible situations. The expected utility is thus EV IR(1,−). (See the dis-
cussion of case(iv).)25 Proceeding in this way, we can rank all the possible
23 In this case, it can be shown that EV IR(1, 0) > EV
I
R(0, 0) for all α > 2 and t < 1.
24 EV IR(−, 1)−EV IR(1, 1) = t2 (1+ α2 )−αt2,which follows from cases (i) and (v). The above
result is obtained from this difference along with the fact that α > 2.
25 EV IR(−, 1) ≤ EV IR(1,−) when t < 12 .
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situations that the incumbent leader would face for different choices of βI
and βO and this analysis leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the present model with fully rational agents, if the demand for
state provided service is high (α > 2), and if t > 1
2
, then tI = tO = t if and only if
2 < α < 2(t−1)
1−3t . If t >
1
2
, and α > 2(t−1)
1−3t , then there exists no equilibrium. Also if
t < 1
2
, then no equilibrium exists.
Proof. For t > 1
2
, and 2 < α < 2(t−1)
(1−3t) , it has already been shown that
EV IR(1, 1) > EV
I
R(, 1). Also from the above discussion,EV
I
R(, 1) > EV
I
R(0, 1)
∀α. Moreover from cases (ii) and (v), EV IR(1, 1) > EV IR(1, 0), which proves
the first part of the proposition. If the fiscal capacity is relatively low, t < 1
2
,
then EV IR(1,−) dominates all possible situations. Since for any choice of
, there exists a still smaller number for which the expected utility is maxi-
mized, clearly there is no equilibrium in this case.
Note that 2(t−1)
1−3t should be greater than 2, and that happens only if t >
1
2
.
So a higher fiscal capacity coupled with moderately high valuation of the
state provided service gives incentive to provide the highest amount of the
service. On the one hand, with a very high value of government service,
it becomes optimal for the incumbent leader to provide subsidy to its own
group members. In this case, the increase in the vote share and in the private
benefit to the leader outweighs the gain from more government service. For
lesser fiscal capacity, incumbent leader tries to increase the probability of
retaining power by subsidizing the opposition. On the other hand, if the
incumbent leader loses, it would benefit from the subsidy.
Case III : Low valuation of state provided service (α < 2)
(i) Suppose tI = βIt, tO = −βOt and βI > βO > 0 . That is the incumbent
leader taxes its own group members, while opposition members receives
subsidy. Total amount of government service in the economy is G = 1
2
(βI −
βO)t. In this situation the incumbent group members would not support,
while those in opposition would support the incumbent leader. Thus, γ =
1
2
. Substituting this into equation (9), the expected utility of the incumbent
leader is:
EV IR = 1− (1−
α
2
)(βI − βO) t
2
≤ 1. (16)
The incumbent leader maximises the expected utility, by choosing βI =
βO = β∗, and correspondingly EV IR = 1.
(ii) Consider the polar opposite case, i.e., the incumbent leader taxes the
opponent group, while subsidises its own members. Thus, tI = −βIt and
tO = βOt and β0 > βI > 0. This is very similar to the previous case, and
γ = 1
2
, while EV IR = 1 − (1 − α2 )(βO − βI) t2 ≤ 1.The optimal choice and
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the expected utility level of the incumbent leader would be similar to the
previous case.
(iii) Suppose tI = 0 and tO = βOt. This in turn implies that only
some of the incumbent members would get the government service, and
the total amount of government service available in the economy would be
G = 1
2
βOt. Since all those who receives the government service actually has
to pay taxes, γ = 1
2
βOt. Thus, EV IR = 1−βOt+ β
O2t2
2
(1+ α
2
), which is a convex
function andEV IR(β
I = 0, βO = 0) = 1 > EV IR(β
I = 0, βO = 1) = t+ t
2
2
(1+α
2
).
(iv) Consider the case, that tI = βIt and tO = 0. In this case, nobody
would support the incumbent leader and as a result γ = 0, and EV IR = 0.
(v) Suppose that the incumbent leader imposes tax on both groups. That
is tI = βIt and tO = βOt, where both βI , βO ≥ 0. Then total amount of
government service in the economy is G = t
2
(βI + βO). Now the proba-
bility that the incumbent leader would retain power can be either greater,
lesser or equal to G.26 Since α < 2, this situation is arising in case (v). For
the different possible positive combinations of the tax rates, corresponding
support base of the incumbent leader would be different. For example, if G
> 1
2
and all those who receive the government service is better off due to re-
distribution then γ = G. However, if only opposition members who receive
the government service is benefited then γ = G− 1
2
. It can be shown that for
γ = G, the expected utility would always be higher.27 Similarly, there are
other sub cases also. Thus in this case, we need to segregate the objective
function of the incumbent leader into appropriate zones, and then find the
global optimum from the different local optimum from each zone. Thus,
we need to concentrate only on this case. From, equation (9), the expected
utility of the incumbent leader is:
EV IR = 1− βIt(1−
α
2
)
t
2
(βI + βO)− βOt[1− (1 + α
2
)
t
2
(βI + βO)]. (17)
It can be shown that the expression in equation (17) does not have an inte-
rior solution, when it is maximised in terms of βI and βO.
It is sufficient to evaluate equation (17), only at the corner points, i.e.
when either of the taxes imposed are zero, or both are equal to t, or one of
them is t, while the other is zero.
EV IR(β
I = 0, βO = 0) = 1 (18)
EV IR(β
I = 1, βO = 0) = 1 +
t2
2
(1 +
α
2
− t) (19)
26 This is because α2 (β
k − 1) + α2 (βv) is of ambiguous sign, where k and v represents two
different groups.
27 The proof of this statement is available from the authors on request.
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EV IR(β
I = 0, βO = 1) = 1− t
2
2
(1− α
2
) (20)
EV IR(β
I = 1, βO = 1) = 1 + t2α− t. (21)
Also, EV IR(β
I = 1, βO = 1) = (1+ t2α− t) > 1 = EV IR(βI = βO = 0), if α > 1t .
The above discussions directly leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In the present model with fully rational agents, when the valuation
of the government service is low, that is α < 2, then if α > 1
t
, then tI = tO = t. If
α < 1
t
, then tI = tO = 0.
The above proposition says that when the demand for the state provided
services is low then, the chance of provisioning the service is inversely re-
lated with the fiscal policy for a given value of α. That is, for a given value of
α, which is less than 2, if the fiscal capacity is low enough, then it is highly
probable that government will not provide any service in the equilibrium
(for example, when t < 1
2
).
3 Discussion: Active opposition
The previous two sections contain detailed analysis of the possible strate-
gies of the incumbent leader. The role of the opposition is very passive, if
not silent. One can interpret the stochastic nature of the political regime as a
passive role of the opposition. That is, the probability of not retaining power
by incumbent leader is non zero (strictly positive). Therefore 1 − γ can be
considered as an index of the performance of opposition. However, this can
also be explained as nothing but a manifestation of the vote against the in-
capability of the ruling government (almost equivalent to anti-incumbency
force). This model can thus encompass a simple extension where the opposi-
tion is active and can potentially invest to reduce the probability of retaining
power by the ruling government.
For notational ease (and to give a realistic idea), costly action of the op-
position leader will be termed as “investment in arms” (or just as “armed
conflict”). The investment in arms by the opposition leader does not neces-
sarily imply a successful transfer of political authority. Nonetheless, strictly
positive investment in arms by the opposition leader will reduce the proba-
bility of winning for the incumbent leader (say, γA is now the probability of
winning for the incumbent leader). A convenient form is the following:
γA = G− µAO. (22)
where 0 < µ < 1 and is a measure of the marginal impact of arms, devel-
oped by the opposition, on the probability of retaining power by the incum-
bent. AO ∈ [0, A] is the amount of arms the opposition decides to develop.
It is further assumed that the amount of arms that can be developed by
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the opposition leader can at the most be A, which is bounded from above
by the fiscal capacity of the state i.e. A < t. The basic difference between
the models developed in this section and the model developed in the pre-
vious section is that while in the previous section the left wing opposition
leader was a passive recipient, here it has one strategic variable at its dis-
posal by virtue of which it can influence the probability of power transfer.
The remaining characterization of the equilibrium for both partially ratio-
nal agents and fully rational agents is similar. We will explain the technique
and the result for the basic model with partially rational agents, in brief.
The new objective function of the incumbent leader will be very similar
to the previous cases:
EV IR =
[
(1−tI)+α
2
(tI+tO)
]
(
tI + tO
2
−µAO)+(1−tO)(1− t
I + tO
2
+µAO). (23)
Now, the optimization exercise for the incumbent leader is a two stage opti-
mization problem, because AO is an endogenous variable but is determined
by the opposition leader. In the first stage incumbent leader follows the
technique of optimization as in section 2, while considering AO as given.
Therefore this optimisation gives the best response function to the incum-
bent leader for each value of AO.
The opposition leader will invest in arms only if the gain from investing
is strictly positive in comparison with not investing in arms. Opposition
leader considers the tax rates announced by the incumbent leader as given.
Suppose the payoff of the opposition is EV L(AO 6=0) when the opposition in-
vests and produces arms, and EV L(AO=0) be the payoff when the opposition
leader decides not to invest in arms. Thus, if φ(= EV L(AO 6=0) −EV L(AO=0)) > 0,
then AO > 0, and it is contingent upon the tax rates set by the incumbent
leader. Therefore, the best response function of the opposition leader for
each action of the incumbent leader can be obtained in this way. Finally,
the equilibrium can be obtained from the two best response functions,. The
main result of this simple extension of the basic model is given by the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 5 i)If α > 2(1+µA)
t−µA and αt >
1
µ
, then tI∗ = tO∗ = t and A0∗ = A
ii)If α > 2
t
and µt < 1
µ
, then tI∗ = tO∗ = t and A0∗ = 0.
iii) If α < 2
t
then tI∗ = t, tO∗ = −t and A0∗ = 0.
We skip the proof of the above proposition.28
In case the valuation of the government service is less (low level of α),
opposition is going to get the subsidy. The intuition is similar to that in
28 The proof is available on request from the authors.
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the previous section. Moreover, to have a situation of armed conflict, α
should be sufficiently high along with a high marginal impact of arms on
the probability of power change (µ). Therefore, armed conflict does not
work as a threat in state service provisioning in this model. In other words,
if it is more likely, that the service will be provided by the government,
then only it will be incentive compatible (such that it outweighs the cost of
arm accumulation) for the opposition leader to invest in arms to swing the
power in his/her favour. Otherwise, it is not beneficial for the opposition
leader to fetch the power in the next period by costly means. Therefore,
the opposition leader will become proactive only in those cases where the
marginal benefit from the government service is very high and not the other
way round, that is, it does not push the government to provide the service.
One can carry out a similar exercise for the fully rational agents. The
techniques and results are grossly similar and intuitive. The motive of the
above discussion is to show that this very simple model is capable to incor-
porate an active opposition leader.29
4 Conclusion
Welfare states typically provide various services for its citizens. Another
defining feature of modern welfare states is intense political rivalry among
various heterogeneous group. This paper has considered the interaction be-
tween these two factors. Interestingly, the model had emphasized the causal
direction from fiscal policy to political regime change. We have studied the
situation in which the decision of the voters are believed to be affected by
the supply of public services by the government. The model has considered
two types of agents: partially rational agents and fully rational agents. The
former values only the provisioning of the government service, while the
latter compares the gain from the government service vis-a-vis no redistri-
bution. With fully rational agents, in some cases no equilibrium may exist,
though optimal policy direction can be obtained. It has been shown that
low demand for government service can lead the incumbent leader to actu-
ally subsidize the opposition. Moreover, as an extension, the scope to model
an active opposition and the possible corresponding results have been dis-
cussed. We argue that the opposition leader would only have an incentive
to foster an armed revolution (that is typically costly action) when the de-
mand for the state provided services is sufficiently high. Therefore, costly
armed action may not become a threat to the provisioning of government
services.
29 This extension for fully rational agents is available on request.
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Appendix
This appendix provides the formal proof of Proposition 1. To arrive at
this proposition, we proceed through the following lemmas.
Equations (5) and (6) are plotted in Figure 2 in the (tI , tO) plane when α <
2. These lines divide the plane into four zones designated as (i), (ii), (iii)
and (iv) and lines PQ and RS represent δEV
I
R
δtO
= 0 and δEV
I
R
δtI
= 0 respectively.
Figure 2 - Optimal choice of tax rates in absence of arms when α < 2
Lemma 1 Suppose EV IR(l) represent the maximum possible expected
utility of the incumbent right wing leader, in the zone l, where l ∈ {(i), (ii),
(iii), (iv)} and the ruler makes the optimal choice within a particular zone.
Then, when α < 2
EV IR(i) = 1 + t+ αt
2,
EV IR(ii) = 1− t,
EV IR(iii) = 1− t(1− αt), and
EV IR(iv) = 1 + t.
Proof. Consider the line PQ, above this line for any given value of tI ,
δEV IR
δtO
> 0 (this follows directly from equation 5). So it is always optimal
for the incumbent leader to choose, tO∗ = t in this region (∀tI). Below the
line PQ, for any given value of tI , δEV
I
R
δtO
< 0. So it is always optimal for the
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ruler to choose tO∗ = −t (∀tI).
Similarly, consider the line RS. Above this line, given a particular value
of tO, δEV
I
R
δtI
< 0 (this follows directly from equation 6). The incumbent leader
should set tI∗ = −t (∀tO). Below this line RS, δEV
I
R
δtI
> 0. The optimal choice
for the ruler is tI∗ = t (∀tO).
Therefore from Figure 2, this would imply that in
zone (i), tO∗ = −t and tI∗ = −t,
zone (ii), tO∗ = t and tI∗ = −t,
zone (iii), tO∗ = t and tI∗ = t,
zone (iv), tO∗ = −t and tI∗ = t.
Substituting these values into equation (4), the lemma is proved.
Assuming that α > 2, equations (5) and (6) are plotted in Figure 3 in the
(tI , tO) plane. It divides the plane into four zones designated as (v), (vi),
(vii) and (viii) and lines EF and GH represent δEV
I
R
δtO
= 0 and δEV
I
R
δtI
= 0,
respectively.
Figure 3 - Optimal choice of tax rates in absence of arms when α > 2
Lemma 2 Suppose EV IR(j) represents the maximum possible expected
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utility of the incumbent right wing leader, in the zone j, where j ∈ {(v), (vi),
(vii) and (viii)} and the ruler makes the optimal choice within a particular
zone. Then, when α > 2,
EV IR(v) = 1 + t+ αt
2,
EV IR(vi) = 1− t,
EV IR(vii) = 1− t(1− αt) and
EV IR(viii) = 1 + t.
The proof is identical to that of Lemma 1. Interestingly, lemma 1 and 2
imply that regardless of the level of demand for G, the entire choice space
of the incumbent leader can be divided in terms of the symmetric optimal
values of tI and tO. Suppose a, b, c and d represent the zones where, the
incumbent leader is constrained to operate. Then, EV IR(a) = 1 + t + αt
2,
EV IR(b) = 1− t, EV IR(c) = 1− t(1− αt) and EV IR(d) = 1 + t.30
Lemmas 1 and 2 can be combined to arrive at proposition 1. To facilitate
our exposition, we provide a formal proof of proposition 1 below.
Proof of proposition 1
Proof. Clearly, EV IR(a) = 1 + t + αt2 is not possible. This is simply because
it is not feasible (as in this case tI∗ = tO∗ = −t, this would imply G < 0).
Also, EV IR(b) = 1 − t < EV IR(c) = 1 − t(1 − αt) and thus can never be the
equilibrium pay off of the leader. ComparingEV IR(c) andEV
I
R(d), it is found
that:
EV IR(c) > EV
I
R(d) if α >
2
t
EV IR(c) ≤ EV IR(d) if α ≤ 2t .
From lemmas 1 and 2, the optimal choices of the tax rates are tI∗ = tO∗ = t
and tI∗ = t, tO∗ = −t when the expected returns of the incumbent leader are
EV IR(c) and EV
I
R(d) respectively. Hence, the proposition is proved.
30 In Figure 1, a, b, c and d are represented as (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) respectively. In Figure
2, they are represented as (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) respectively.
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